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We show that superselection rules do not enhance the information-theoretic security of quantum
cryptographic protocols. Our analysis employs two quite different methods. The first method uses
the concept of a reference system — in a world subject to a superselection rule, unrestricted oper-
ations can be simulated by parties who share access to a reference system with suitable properties.
By this method, we prove that if an n-party protocol is secure in a world subject to a superselection
rule, then the security is maintained even if the superselection rule is relaxed. However, the proof
applies only to a limited class of superselection rules, those in which the superselection sectors are
labeled by unitary irreducible representations of a compact symmetry group. The second method
uses the concept of the format of a message sent between parties — by verifying the format, the
recipient of a message can check whether the message could have been sent by a party who per-
formed charge-conserving operations. By this method, we prove that protocols subject to general
superselection rules (including those pertaining to nonabelian anyons in two dimensions) are no
more secure than protocols in the unrestricted world. However, the proof applies only to two-party
protocols. Our results show in particular that, if no assumptions are made about the computational
power of the cheater, then secure quantum bit commitment and strong quantum coin flipping with
arbitrarily small bias are impossible in a world subject to superselection rules.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
The central aim of modern cryptography is to for-
mulate protocols that achieve cryptographic tasks with
computational security, meaning that a dishonest party
would need to perform a prohibitively difficult compu-
tation to break the protocol. A major goal of quan-
tum cryptography is to formulate protocols, involving the
exchange of quantum states, that achieve information-
theoretic security, meaning that even an adversary with
unlimited computational power would be unable to de-
feat the protocol [1]. Information-theoretic security
(sometimes called “unconditional security”) has been es-
tablished for quantum key distribution protocols [2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7] but it has also been shown that, even in the
quantum world, information-theoretic security is not at-
tainable for certain tasks. For example, unconditionally
secure quantum bit commitment is impossible [8, 9], as
is (strong) quantum coin flipping with arbitrarily small
bias [10, 11].
Superselection rules are limitations on the physically
realizable quantum operations that can be carried out
by a local agent. For example, it is impossible to create
or destroy an isolated particle that carries locally con-
served charges, such as an electrically charged particle,
a fermion, or (in a two-dimensional medium) an anyon.
Recently, Popescu [12] has suggested that superselection
rules might have interesting implications for the security
of quantum cryptographic protocols. The intuitive idea
behind this suggestion is that superselection rules could
place inviolable limits on the cheating strategies available
to the dishonest parties, thus enhancing security. Might,
say, unconditionally secure bit commitment be possible
in worlds (perhaps including the physical world that we
inhabit) governed by suitable superselection rules? An
affirmative answer could shake the foundations of cryp-
tography.
The purpose of this paper is to answer Popescu’s in-
triguing question. Sadly, our conclusion is that superse-
lection rules can never foil a cheater who has unlimited
quantum-computational power.
In the case of quantum bit commitment, and other
two-party protocols, our argument hinges on a quite sim-
ple observation. In a two-party protocol, one participant
(Alice) has control of a local system A, and the other
participant (Bob) has control of another local system B.
In addition, there is a message system M that they pass
back and forth. In each step of the protocol, one party
performs a joint quantum operation on her/his local sys-
tem and the message system, and then sends the message
system to the other party. Suppose that in each step, any
part of the full system ABM that is beyond Alice’s con-
trol is under Bob’s control and vice-versa — no part of
the full system is inaccessible or in the possession of a
third party. Suppose further that the full system ABM
has trivial total charge (belongs to the trivial superse-
lection sector). Then at any stage of the protocol, the
algebra of operations that Alice can perform is the com-
mutant of the algebra of operations that Bob can per-
form; that is, Alice’s algebra contains all operations that
commute with Bob’s algebra. Likewise, Bob’s algebra is
the commutant of Alice’s. By a minor extension of the
standard argument, it then follows that unconditionally
secure quantum bit commitment is impossible if the total
charge shared by the parties is trivial.
Now, if the total charge in nontrivial, then Alice’s al-
gebra is surely a subalgebra of the commutant of Bob’s,
but it may be a proper subalgebra; similarly, Bob’s alge-
bra may be a proper subalgebra of Alice’s. This unusual
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bilities for the design of quantum protocols. Regrettably,
though, there is no way for an honest party to ensure
that the total charge is really nontrivial, when the other
party is dishonest. Though the honest protocol may call
for the parties to start out with nontrivial charges, we
may always imagine that there are actually compensat-
ing charges beyond the grasp of Alice and Bob, so that
the total charge of the world is really trivial. Further-
more, a cheater might seize control of the compensating
charge, while for an honest party it makes no difference
whether the compensating charge is present or not. It
follows that a protocol that calls for the total charge to
be nontrivial can be no more secure than one in which
the total charge is actually trivial; we conclude again
that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is
impossible, irrespective of the value of the total charge
shared by the parties in the honest protocol.
Aside from quantum bit commitment, we will
also study the impact of superselection rules on the
information-theoretic security of a broad class of other
quantum protocols, using two different methods. We an-
alyze in detail the important special case where the su-
perselection sectors can be identified with the unitary ir-
reducible representations of a compact symmetry group.
In that case, we argue that it is possible in principle to
prepare a reference state that establishes a preferred ori-
entation in the symmetry group. A party with access to
the reference state can use it to perform operations that
are ostensibly forbidden by the superselection rule. In
particular, consider an n-party quantum protocol where
up to k < n of the parties are dishonest, and suppose
that in a world with no superselection rules the dishonest
parties have a cheating strategy that breaks the protocol.
Then, even in a world with superselection rules, the dis-
honest parties, by sharing a suitable reference state, can
simulate this cheating strategy faithfully. We conclude
that if a quantum protocol is information-theoretically
secure in a world with a superselection rule, the security
will be maintained even if the superselection rule is re-
laxed, at least in the case where the superselection rule
arises from a compact symmetry group.
Superselection rules arising from compact symmetry
groups are not the most general possible ones. In partic-
ular, an especially rich variety of superselection rules are
potentially realizable in two-dimensional systems such as
those that admit nonabelian anyons. However even su-
perselection rules of this more general kind cannot foil
a cheater. We find that for any two-party protocol that
is secure in a world subject to a superselection rule, the
security is maintained when the superselection rule is re-
laxed.
Our analysis of these more general superselection rules
does not rely on the concept of a reference system; rather
it is founded on a completely different idea, the concept
of the format of a message. A superselection rule can
always be characterized by saying that there are charges
that must be conserved by all local operations, and when
we relax the superselection rule, in effect we are permit-
ting a cheater to violate these conservation laws. For the
purpose of assessing the security of a two-party protocol,
we are interested in how the actions of the cheating party
(Alice) affect the outcomes of measurements performed
by the honest party (Bob). Potentially, if Alice is granted
the power to violate conservation of “charge,” her ability
to influence Bob’s measurements will be strengthened.
However, if the total charge shared by Alice and Bob
is trivial (as we are entitled to assume in an analysis of
security), then if charge is conserved, Alice and Bob hold
conjugate charges at each stage of the protocol. There-
fore, Bob always knows what charge Alice is supposed
to have, which constrains the type of message that Alice
can send to Bob if she is honest. When Bob receives a
message he can verify its format, checking whether the
message could have been sent by a party who performed
a charge-conserving operation, and he can abort the pro-
tocol if the verification fails. Therefore, if the protocol
ends normally, Alice has been forced to respect charge
conservation — her power to flout the superselection rule
does not enhance her ability to fool Bob. This reasoning
shows that superselection rules cannot thwart cheating,
but because the argument relies on the property that Al-
ice and Bob hold perfectly correlated charges, it works
only for two-party protocols.
For cryptographic protocols with more than two par-
ties, and for general superselection rules, new subtleties
arise. In two spatial dimensions, general charges are not
merely locally conserved, they may also have nontrivial
braiding properties — the exchange of two charges may
induce a nontrivial transformation on their joint Hilbert
space. This means that the effect of sending a message
from one party to another can depend on the path along
which the message travels. It is an interesting problem to
specify appropriate definitions of security for protocols in
this setting, but we will not attempt to address this issue
here. For the special case of charges labeled by unitary
representations of compact groups, the braiding prop-
erties are trivial; therefore in that case we can analyze
multiparty protocols without confronting such questions.
Verstraete and Cirac [13] recently discussed a data-
hiding protocol whose security is premised on a super-
selection rule. However, as the authors recognized, the
protocol is not unconditionally secure; it can be broken if
the parties establish a suitable shared reference state via
quantum communication. The notion that the naive im-
plications of a superselection rule can be evaded through
the use of a suitable reference system was emphasized
long ago by Aharonov and Susskind [14]; see [15] for a
recent discussion. A special case of our main result was
reported earlier in [16].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We de-
velop the concept of a reference system in Sec. II, first for
abelian, then for nonabelian symmetries, and we explain
how a reference system can be used to simulate unre-
stricted operations in a world subject to superselection
rules arising from a symmetry group; this observation is
3applied in Sec. III to the analysis of the security of quan-
tum protocols. In Sec. IV we explore the distinction be-
tween an itinerant reference system that is passed from
party to party as needed during a protocol, and a dis-
tributed reference system that can be prepared and passed
out to the parties before the protocol begins. Superselec-
tion rules arising from nonabelian symmetries are further
characterized in Sec. V, and we comment in Sec. VI on
the data-hiding protocol of Verstraete and Cirac. Our
analysis of the impact of superselection rules on the se-
curity of quantum bit commitment is in Sec. VII; we also
show there that for the analysis of security of an n-party
protocol, it suffices to consider the case in which the total
charge held by the parties is trivial. Two-party protocols
subject to general superselection rules are investigated
in Sec. VIII, and Sec. IX contains some concluding com-
ments.
II. SUPERSELECTION RULES AND
REFERENCE SYSTEMS
A superselection rule is a decomposition of Hilbert
space into sectors that are preserved by local operations.
The different sectors can be distinguished by attaching
to each sector a label, which we refer to as the sector’s
“charge.” Therefore, an equivalent way to characterize
a superselection rule is to say that the charge is locally
conserved. In the context of a cryptographic protocol,
this means that when one of the parties (Alice, say) per-
forms an operation, the charge in Alice’s laboratory is
preserved.
An important special case arises if the Hilbert space
H transforms as a unitary representation of a compact
group G, and the sectors are labeled by the irreducible
representations of G. An equivalent way to describe the
superselection rule in that case is to say that the allowed
operations must commute with the action of G on H.
In fact, it has been shown by Doplicher and Roberts [17]
that such superselection rules are almost the most general
ones allowed under rather weak conditions that apply in
particular to quantum field theories (without gravity) in
three or more spatial dimensions. We say “almost” be-
cause there is an additional freedom to assign to a local-
ized state an even or odd fermion number. This fermion
number is more than just a conserved charge, because of
the property that the wave function changes sign when
two fermions are exchanged.
In two spatial dimensions, there is a richer classifica-
tion of superselection rules, reflecting the exotic quantum
numbers carried by pointlike nonabelian anyons that oc-
cur in topological quantum field theories [18, 19, 20]. We
will postpone further discussion of nonabelian anyons un-
til Sec. VIII, concentrating for now on the superselection
rules associated with compact symmetry groups (and ig-
noring fermions).
An important example is the group U(1) associated
with conservation of the electric charge Q. An agent act-
ing locally can create or annihilate pairs of particles that
carry equal and opposite charges, but cannot change the
total charge in her vicinity. In particular, this agent is
unable to transform any eigenstate of Q into a coherent
superposition of states with different charges, as empha-
sized by Wick, Wightman, and Wigner [21, 22].
While we might readily accept that local creation of
electric charge is physically impossible, other conserva-
tion laws impose superselection rules that do more vio-
lence to our intuition. Suppose, for example (in nonrela-
tivistic quantum mechanics), that our agent’s actions are
required to conserve the angular momentum ~J locally.
Are we to conclude that if the agent is presented with a
spin-1/2 object polarized spin-up along the z axis, it is
impossible for him to transform it to a coherent superpo-
sition of the spin-up and spin-down states? How are we
to describe what happens when a magnetic field is turned
on pointing in the x direction and the spin begins to pre-
cess? A partial resolution of this puzzle is attained by
noting that the angular momentum of a classical magnet
has an uncertainty large compared to ~, so that conserva-
tion of angular momentum need not prevent the magnet
from coherently exchanging Jz = ~ with the spin. But
this explanation does not fully address how the existence
of the classical magnet is itself compatible with the su-
perselection rule.
Such issues were cogently discussed many years ago by
Aharonov and Susskind [14]. They emphasized that even
if the total angular momentum has a definite value (like
zero), we can still speak sensibly of the relative orien-
tation of two subsystems. Whenever an experimentalist
observes the precession of a spin, it is implicit that a
reference state has been established that in effect breaks
the rotational symmetry, and that the precession is mea-
sured relative to this reference standard. Furthermore,
Aharonov and Susskind [14] emphasized that just as con-
servation of angular momentum need not prevent us from
measuring the relative angular orientation of two objects,
so the charge superselection rule need not prevent us from
measuring relative phases in superpositions of states of
different charge.
A. Abelian case
Before we discuss the more general case in which the
symmetry may be nonabelian, it will be useful to con-
sider the symmetry group G = U(1). Then the charge
operator Q (the generator of G) has eigenvalues q ∈ Z,
and we denote the corresponding orthonormal eigenstates
by |q〉. Formal states of definite phase (with continuum
normalization) can be constructed as
|θ〉 = 1√
2π
∞∑
q=−∞
e−iqθ|q〉 (0 ≤ θ < 2π) , (1)
4where
〈θ′|θ〉 = 1
2π
∞∑
q=−∞
e−iq(θ−θ
′) = δ(θ′ − θ) , (2)
and
|q〉 = 1√
2π
∫ 2π
0
dθ eiqθ |θ〉 . (3)
The phase state |θ〉 is the improper eigenstate with eigen-
value eiθ of the unitary operator
U+ =
∞∑
q=−∞
|q + 1〉〈q| (4)
that increments the value of the charge by one unit.
While the phase θ is physically unobservable due to the
charge superselection rule, the relative phase of θ′ − θ of
the two states |θ′〉 and |θ〉 commutes with the charge op-
erator Q and so is measurable in principle. Indeed, the
state ∫ 2π
0
dθ′′ |θ′ + θ′′〉 ⊗ |θ + θ′′〉
=
∞∑
q=−∞
e−iq(θ−θ
′)| − q〉 ⊗ |q〉 (5)
has a definite value of the relative phase θ′ − θ and total
charge zero. That is, it is an (unnormalizable) eigenstate
with eigenvalue ei(θ−θ
′) of the charge-conserving operator
U− ⊗ U+, where U− = U †+.
Similarly, the phases φq appearing in the expansion of
the state |ψ〉A of a system A,
|ψ〉A =
∑
q
ψqe
−iqφq |q〉A (6)
(where the ψq’s are real and positive), are themselves
unobservable, but they can be meaningfully compared
to the phases appearing in the state |θ〉R of a charge
reservoir R. For example, by projecting |θ〉R⊗|ψ〉A onto
the sector with total charge zero we obtain the state
|ψ〉RA = 1√
2π
∫
dθ′ |θ + θ′〉R ⊗ e−iQθ
′ |ψ〉A
=
∑
q
ψqe
−iq(φq−θ)| − q〉R ⊗ |q〉A (7)
which has measurable relative phases. A state like |θ〉R
of a charge reservoir R that provides a phase standard
with which other states can be compared will be called a
“reference state” or a “condensate.”
In the state |ψ〉RA, the charge of the system A is com-
pensated (“screened”) by the charge of the reservoir R.
Therefore, the system and reservoir are entangled, and
tracing out the reservoir destroys the coherence of the
superposition of charge states for the system. While for-
mally correct, this statement can be misleading if the
reservoir remains accessible and is allowed to interact
with the system during subsequent operations. For ex-
ample, the operator (U+)A that increases the charge of
the system by one unit is disallowed by the superselec-
tion rule, but it can be accurately simulated by the al-
lowed charge-conserving operator (U−)R ⊗ (U+)A acting
on |ψ〉RA — this operator increases the charge of A by
borrowing a unit of charge from R. If the reservoir re-
mains accessible at all times, then an arbitrary (not nec-
essarily charge conserving) operation acting on A can be
perfectly simulated by a charge-conserving operation act-
ing on RA. Thus, at least as a matter of principle, the
charge superselection rule places no inescapable restric-
tions on the allowed operations. This is the main point
stressed by Aharonov and Susskind [14].
The phase reference state can be interpreted physically
as a static piece of superconducting material with a defi-
nite value of the superconducting phase. While the phase
itself is not gauge-invariant, the relative phase of the sys-
tem and reservoir has observable consequences (like the
Josephson effect) when the two are brought into contact.
Similar issues, discussed in [23, 24, 25, 26, 27], arise when
considering the physical content of relative phases in op-
tical systems.
B. Nonabelian case
Our discussion of the abelian case has suggested that
superselection rules are nullified if suitable reference sys-
tems are available. Now we consider the more general
case, where the symmetry group is G, which may be
either a finite group or a compact Lie group. The su-
perselection rule dictates that allowed local operations
must commute with G. But we may anticipate that if
a condensate is accessible that completely breaks the G
symmetry, then in effect there is no operative symmetry
at all, and the superselection rules place no restrictions
on the allowed operations.
Formally, if the symmetry is completely broken, then
the possible orientations of the condensate are in one-to-
one correspondence with the elements of the symmetry
group G. In a particular “fixed gauge,” the states of
the condensate are denoted |φ〉 where φ ∈ G, and these
states transform as the left regular representation of G.
That is, a symmetry transformation g ∈ G acting on the
condensate is represented by the unitary U(g) where
U(g)|φ〉 → |gφ〉 . (8)
These states can be expanded in the basis of irreducible
representations of G as
|φ〉 =
∑
q,i,a
√
nq
nG
Dqia(φ)|q, i, a〉 , (9)
where nq denotes the dimension of the irreducible repre-
sentation Dq(φ) and nG is the order of G. Inverting the
5Fourier transform we obtain
|q, i, a〉 =
∑
φ∈G
√
nq
nG
Dq∗ia (φ)|φ〉 . (10)
Note that in eq. (9,10) we have used notation appropriate
for a finite group; in the case of a compact Lie group, the
sum over φ ∈ G would be replaced by an integral with
respect to an invariant measure on the group. The states
|q, i, a〉 transform under G as
U(g)|q, i, a〉 =
∑
j
|q, j, a〉Dqji(g) . (11)
In keeping with standard physics terminology, we will
refer to the index i = 1, 2, . . . , nq in |q, i, a〉 as the “color
index,” and to the action eq. (11) of U(g) on this index
as a “gauge transformation.” The index a = 1, 2, . . . , nq,
distinguishing the nq copies of the representation D
q
that occur in the decomposition of the regular represen-
tation, will be called the “flavor” index. The physical
“G-invariant” operations are those that commute with
all gauge transformations — these preserve q and act
nontrivially only on the flavor, not the color. Therefore,
by including the color we have chosen a redundant de-
scription of the physical Hilbert space. This redundancy,
while not absolutely necessary, is quite convenient, and
in particular will be useful for our discussion in Sec. III
of the security of quantum protocols.
In addition to the G gauge symmetry, there is also a
group G of “global” transformations that commute with
U(g), under which the states |φ〉 transform as the right
regular representation of G; the element h of the global
group is represented by V (h) where
V (h)|φ〉 = |φh−1〉 , (12)
and
V (h)|q, i, a〉 =
∑
b
|q, i, b〉Dq∗ba(h) . (13)
Thus the global transformations act on the flavor index
a of the states in the {|q, i, a〉} basis — unlike the gauge
transformations, they act nontrivially on the physical
states.
In more geometric terms, a condensate may be inter-
preted as an asymmetric classical rigid body that can be
rotated either “actively” or “passively.” What we have
called the color (gauge) rotation is a passive rotation that
acts on the space-fixed axes — it does not change the ac-
tual orientation of the body but only changes our mathe-
matical description of the orientation. In contrast, what
we have called the flavor (global) rotation is an active
rotation that acts on the body-fixed axes and alters the
physical orientation. A flavor rotation is G-invariant in
the sense that it commutes with color rotations, and so is
a physical operation, allowed by the superselection rule.
In contrast to the flavor orientation, the color orienta-
tion of an isolated system A has no invariant meaning, as
it is modified by a color rotation. However, the orienta-
tion of A relative to the condensate R does have meaning,
and an operator that rotates the relative orientation ad-
mits an invariant description. Suppose, for example, that
system A is itself a condensate in the state φA, while the
state of R is φR. The relative orientation
φR¯A ≡ φ−1R φA (14)
is invariant if a common color rotation
U(h)RA : φA → hφA , φR → hφR (15)
is applied to both objects. The transformation U(g)invRA
that changes the relative orientation according to
U(g)invRA : φR¯A → gφR¯A , (16)
has an invariant meaning and commutes with the color
rotation U(h)RA. We may interpret the invariant rota-
tion as one that rotates A while R is “held fixed,” acting
as
U(g)invRA
(|φR〉 ⊗ |φA〉) = |φR〉 ⊗ |φRgφ−1R φA〉 , (17)
or equivalently
U(g)invRA =
∑
φ∈G
(|φ〉〈φ|)R ⊗ U(φgφ−1)A . (18)
If system A is not a reference system but rather an
object transforming as the irreducible representation q
of G, then U(φgφ−1) can be expanded as
U(g)invRA =
∑
φ∈G
(|φ〉〈φ|)R
⊗
∑
i,j,a,b
|q, i〉Dqia(φ)Dqab(g)Dqbj(φ−1)〈q, j|

A
.(19)
More generally, any transformation
MA : |q, i〉A →
∑
j
|q, j〉AMji (20)
acting on the color degree of freedom can be simulated
by the invariant operation
M invRA =
∑
φ∈G
(|φ〉〈φ|)R
⊗
∑
i,j,a,b
|q, i〉Dqia(φ)MabDqbj(φ−1)〈q, j|

A
. (21)
M invRA has an invariant meaning because it transforms the
color of A relative to the color of the reference system R;
in effect, the color rotation is simulated by converting the
color index into a flavor index (depending on φ), on which
6M may act with impunity. For fixed φ, the simulation is
achieved via the isomorphism
|q, a〉A → |q, φ, a〉RA ≡ |φ〉R ⊗
∑
j
|q, j〉ADqja(φ) , (22)
such that
M invRA |q, φ, a〉RA =
∑
b
|q, φ, b〉RAMba . (23)
Furthermore, this isomorphism can be extended to oper-
ators M that change the value of q as well as rotating
the color for fixed q; the operator
MA : |q, i〉A →
∑
q′,j
|q′, j〉AM q
′q
ji , (24)
is simulated by
M invRA |q, φ, a〉RA =
∑
q′,b
|q′, φ, b〉RAM q
′q
ba , (25)
which generalizes the result
M invRA
(|θ〉R ⊗ e−iqθ|q〉A) = |θ〉R ⊗∑
q′
e−iq
′θ|q′〉M q′q
(26)
that we found in the case of G = U(1).
C. Properties of the simulation
We will refer to the world in which all operations are
required to commute with the action of the symmetry
group G as the “invariant world” or “I-world,” and we
refer to the world in which arbitrary operations are al-
lowed as the “unrestricted world” or “U -world.” What
we have observed in eq. (22,25) is that the physics of the
U -world can be faithfully reproduced in the I-world, as
long as a suitable reference system is at our disposal.
Let us restate the main conclusion in a more succinct
notation: Suppose A is an arbitrary system that trans-
forms as some representation of the group G, and let R
be a “reference system” that transforms as the left reg-
ular representation of G. Let M be an arbitrary trans-
formation acting on A. Then there is a corresponding
transformation M inv acting on R and A defined as
M inv =
∑
φ∈G
(|φ〉〈φ|)
R
⊗ (U(φ)MU(φ)−1)
A
. (27)
M inv is an invariant operator whose action on RA simu-
lates the action of M on A.
That is, the operators M inv have the following easily
verified properties:
1. M inv is G-invariant.
Proof: From the transformation properties of R
and A we have(
U(g)⊗ U(g))M inv(U(g)−1 ⊗ U(g)−1)
=
∑
φ∈G
(|gφ〉〈gφ|)⊗ (U(gφ)MU(gφ)−1)
=M inv , (28)
where in the last step we have reparametrized the
sum by replacing φ→ g−1φ.
2. Invariant operators on RA provide a representation
of operators on A.
Proof: We have
M inv1 M
inv
2 =
∑
φ1,φ2∈G
(|φ1〉〈φ1|φ2〉〈φ2|)
⊗(U(φ1)M1U(φ−11 )U(φ2)M2U(φ−12 ))
=
∑
φ∈G
(|φ〉〈φ|) ⊗ (U(φ)M1M2U(φ)−1)
=
(
M1M2
)inv
. (29)
3. If M is G-invariant, then M inv = IR ⊗MA.
Proof: If U(φ) commutes with M for each φ, then
M inv =
∑
φ∈G
(|φ〉〈φ|) ⊗M) = I ⊗M . (30)
4. If ρ is invariant and tr(ρR) = 1, then
tr M inv
(
ρR ⊗ ρ
)
= tr Mρ . (31)
Proof: If U(φ) commutes with ρ for each φ, then
tr M inv
(
ρR ⊗ ρ
)
=
∑
φ∈G
〈φ|ρR|φ〉 tr
(
M U(φ)−1ρU(φ)
)
= tr
(
ρR
) · tr(Mρ) = tr (Mρ) . (32)
The properties 1 and 4 mean that as long as the state
ρ of A is G-invariant, then by making use of a reference
system, measurements in the U -world can be faithfully
simulated by measurements in the I-world. That is, given
an arbitrary measurement performed on A (with opera-
tion elements that are not necessarily G-invariant), there
is an invariant measurement performed on RA (with G-
invariant operation elements) that has the same proba-
bility distribution of outcomes. Furthermore, it follows
from property 2 that the physics of the U -world can be
faithfully reproduced in the I-world even if the measure-
ment is preceded by a series of unitary transformations
— applying V inv in the I-world has the same effect as
applying V in the U -world. Property 3 tells us that, as
expected, the reference system R is superfluous if the U -
world transformation acting on A is already G-invariant.
7To derive these properties, we require that the refer-
ence system transform as the regular representation of
G, but no condition is needed on the state ρR of the ref-
erence system. Loosely speaking, the reference system is
needed so that when a noninvariant operation acts on A,
the change in the charge of A can be balanced by a com-
pensating change in the charge of R. But if the state ρ of
A is invariant, then only the charge-conserving part ofM
contributes to the expectation value tr(Mρ) anyway. In
the simulation of this charge-conserving part of M , the
reference system is superfluous and its state irrelevant.
Note that if G is a Lie group rather than a finite group,
then the regular representation is infinite dimensional,
and our formal arguments require R to be an infinite-
dimensional system. How is the fidelity of the simulation
affected if R is truncated to a finite-dimensional system?
In fact, the fidelity will still be perfect if the charge re-
mains bounded in the process to be simulated. Consider,
for example, the case G = U(1), for which eq. (27) be-
comes, e.g.,(|q− r〉〈q|)inv =∑
q′
(|q′+ r〉〈q′|)
R
⊗ (|q− r〉〈q|)
A
; (33)
in the I-world, a process in which r units of charge are
removed from A is simulated by adding the r units to R.
Suppose we are assured that the total charge added to or
removed from A will never exceed r units. Then we may
choose the initial state of R to carry charge zero, and
we can limit R to the 2r + 1 dimensional space spanned
by the states |qR〉, qR = −r,−r + 1, . . . r − 1, r. This
truncated reference system suffices because states with
|qR| > r will never be accessed in the simulation anyway.
A similar remark applies if G is an arbitrary compact Lie
group.
III. REFERENCE SYSTEMS AND QUANTUM
PROTOCOLS
We have concluded that in the presence of a suit-
able reference system, superselection rules place no in-
escapable restrictions on the allowed operations. We may
anticipate, therefore, that a cryptographic protocol is se-
cure in the invariant “I-world” (governed by the supers-
election rule) if and only if it is secure in the unrestricted
“U -world.” If we faithfully adhere to the usual stringent
principles of quantum cryptology and place no restric-
tions on the resources available to our adversaries, then
we must admit the possibility that the dishonest parties
could share access to a reference system during the execu-
tion of the protocol. For the case of superselection rules
arising from compact symmetry groups, this observation
suffices to answer Popescu’s question about the impact of
superselection rules on the security of quantum protocols.
Let us now discuss this point in greater detail. To be
explicit, consider at first a protocol involving two parties,
Alice and Bob. Alice holds a private local system A that
is beyond Bob’s control, and Bob holds a private local
A
M
B
A out
B out
A1
B1
A2
B2
FIG. 1: A two-player quantum game. Alice and Bob have
private systems, and a message system that they pass back
and forth. At the end of the game, Alice and Bob measure
their private systems.
system B that is beyond Alice’s control. In addition,
there is a message system M that they can pass back
and forth. At the beginning of the protocol, they share a
product state ρA⊗ρB⊗ρM . In each round of the protocol,
one of the parties performs a joint quantum operation on
her/his local system and the message, and then sends
the message system to the other party. Finally, after
all quantum communication is completed, both parties
perform local measurements. (See Fig. 1.)
For example, the goal of the protocol might be to flip
an unbiased coin. In that case, the final measurement
performed by each party has two possible outcomes, 0 or
1. If both parties follow the protocol, then both obtain
the same outcome. Furthermore, the two outcomes are
equiprobable. A coin flipping protocol is secure if neither
party, by departing from the protocol, can bias signifi-
cantly the outcome of the other party’s measurement.
We say that a strong coin flipping protocol has bias ε
if neither party by cheating can force either outcome to
occur with probability greater than 12 + ǫ. In a weak coin
flipping protocol, Alice wins if the outcome is 0 and Bob
wins if the outcome is 1, and we say that the bias is ε if
neither can force a win with probability greater than 12+ǫ.
(Thus, in a weak protocol with bias ε, a cheater might
be able to lose on purpose with a probability exceeding
1
2 + ǫ). Note that the protocol might abort if cheating
is detected; by “the probability of outcome 0” we mean
the joint probability that the protocol does not abort and
the outcome is 0. Kitaev [10, 11] has shown that, if no
superselection rules are imposed, then strong quantum
coin flipping is impossible with bias ε < 1√
2
− 12 = .207.
Ambainis [28] has shown that a weak coin flipping pro-
tocol with bias ε requires at least Ω(log log 1ε ) rounds of
communication.
We are interested in whether these conclusions about
coin flipping in the U -world remain valid in the I-world.
For a coin flipping protocol in the I-world, we may as-
sume that the initial state shared by Alice and Bob is a
tensor product of invariant states ρA ⊗ ρB ⊗ ρM . In the
honest protocol, Alice and Bob take turns applying G-
invariant operations to the system that they share, then
measure invariant observables. In fact, without loss of
generality, we may assume [8] that each operation applied
by Alice or Bob is an invariant unitary transformation,
and that the final measurement is an invariant projective
measurement.
8If Alice and Bob play the game honestly, then the prob-
ability PB(b) that Bob’s measurement yields the partic-
ular outcome b can be expressed as
PB(b) = tr
(
EB,b V
(
ρA ⊗ ρB ⊗ ρM
)
V †
)
, (34)
where
V = VBnVAn . . . VB2VA2VB1VA1 . (35)
Here the VAj are unitary transformations applied to AM
(we have assumed that Alice makes the first move in the
game), the VBj are unitary transformations applied to
BM , and the EB,b are the projectors defining Bob’s fi-
nal measurement. Furthermore, in the I-world protocol,
VAj , VBj , and EB,b are G-invariant. In effect, then, Bob
measures the invariant operator
FB,b = V
†EB,bV (36)
in the invariant state ρA ⊗ ρB ⊗ ρM .
Of course, a protocol in the I-world can be regarded
as a special case of a protocol in the U -world, where
the initial state is a product state, and Kitaev’s result
applies to this U -world protocol. Therefore, one of the
parties (Alice, say) can force one of the outcomes (0, say)
with probability at least 1√
2
. However, Alice’s cheating
strategy that achieves this result might employ opera-
tions that are not G-invariant. To show that Kitaev’s
result also applies to the original I-world protocol, we
must show that Alice’s cheating strategy in the U -world
can be faithfully simulated in the I-world by making use
of a suitable reference system. For this purpose, we apply
the properties of the invariant operator M inv that were
discussed in Sec. II C.
When Alice cheats in the U -world, she replaces the
operator VAj called for in the honest protocol with an
arbitrary operator V ′Aj applied to AM , where V
′
Aj
is not
necessarily G-invariant. Then Bob’s measurement yields
the outcome b with probability
P ′B(b) = tr
(
F ′B,b
(
ρA ⊗ ρB ⊗ ρM
))
, (37)
where
F ′B,b = V
′†EB,bV ′ (38)
and
V ′ = VBnV
′
An . . . VB2V
′
A2VB1V
′
A1 . (39)
This cheating strategy in the U -world can be simu-
lated in the I-world if Alice has a reference system R —
instead of applying the noninvariant operator V ′Aj to the
system AM , she applies the invariant operator V ′invAj to
RAM . Note that since Bob follows the honest protocol,
which requires VBj to be G-invariant, applying VBj to
BM is equivalent to applying V invBj to RBM , by property
3 in Sec. II C. Therefore, when Alice adopts the I-world
strategy, Bob obtains outcome b with probability
P˜ ′B(b) = tr
(
F˜ ′B,b
(
ρR ⊗ ρA ⊗ ρB ⊗ ρM
))
(40)
where
F˜ ′B,b = V˜
′†EB,bV˜ ′ (41)
and
V˜ ′ = V invBn V
′inv
An . . . V
inv
B2 V
′inv
A2 V
inv
B1 V
′inv
A1 . (42)
But since the invariant operators provide a representa-
tion (property 2), we may write V˜ ′ = V ′inv, and since
EB,b = E
inv
B,b as well, we have
F˜ ′B,b = F
′inv
B,b . (43)
Finally, the initial state ρA ⊗ ρB ⊗ ρM shared by Alice
and Bob is G-invariant; therefore, by property 4,
P˜ ′B(b) = P
′
B(b) ; (44)
the measurement outcome b in the I-world protocol oc-
curs with the same probability as the outcome b in the
U -world protocol.
Therefore, Alice’s simulated cheating strategy in the
I-world perfectly reproduces the probability distribution
for Bob’s measurement outcome that is achieved by her
cheating strategy in the U -world. The same is true if
Bob makes the first move in the game instead of Alice.
Similarly, if Bob is the cheater, Bob has a strategy in the
I-world that simulates his U -world cheating strategy. We
conclude that if Alice (or Bob) can cheat in the U -world,
then she (he) can cheat just as successfully in the I-world.
Thus, Kitaev’s proof of the impossibility of strong coin
flipping with bias ǫ < 1√
2
− 12 , originally formulated in
the U -world, also applies to the I-world. Similarly, Am-
bainis’s lower bound on the number of rounds of commu-
nication needed for weak coin flipping also applies to the
I-world.
This conclusion that cheating in the U -world can be
successfully simulated in the I-world applies not just to
coin flipping protocols, but to any two-party protocol in
which the goal of a cheating Alice is to bias the outcome
of a measurement performed by an honest Bob. Further-
more, it is straightforward to generalize the argument
to an n-party protocol, in which k cheating parties wish
to bias the outcomes of measurements performed by the
n− k honest parties. For such a protocol in the I-world,
where the initial state is a product of invariant states, any
cheating strategy that can be executed in the U -world
can be simulated perfectly in the I-world if the k cheat-
ing parties share access to a reference system. Therefore,
the protocol can be no more secure in the I-world than
in the U -world.
To summarize: Let us refer to an n-party quantum
game as an I-world game if the initial state is a product
9of invariant states, and if in the honest protocol all oper-
ations performed by the parties are invariant operations.
If k < n parties are cheaters, we say that their cheating
strategy is an I-world cheating strategy if the cheaters
are required to perform invariant operations, and we say
that their cheating strategy is a U -world cheating strat-
egy if the operations performed by the cheaters are unre-
stricted. Let us say that an I-world cheating strategy is
equivalent to a U -world cheating strategy if both strate-
gies produce the same probability distributions for the
outcomes of the measurements performed by the n − k
honest parties. We have proved:
Theorem 1 Suppose that in the I-world all quantum
operations are required to be G-invariant, where G is a
compact Lie group, and that in the U -world quantum op-
erations are unrestricted. Consider an n-party I-world
quantum game, and a U -world cheating strategy A′ in
which k < n parties cheat. Then there is an I-world
cheating strategy A˜′ that is equivalent to A′.
As we observed in Sec. II C, the reference system required
by the cheaters in the I world can be finite-dimensional,
as long as the cheaters in the U -world apply operations
that change the “charge” by a bounded amount.
IV. DISTRIBUTED REFERENCE SYSTEMS
The key ingredient in our discussion of I-world quan-
tum protocols is the observation that G-noninvariant op-
erations can be faithfully simulated through the use of a
reference system. Suppose, for example, that Alice and
Bob take turns acting on a system C that they pass back
and forth. Then Alice and Bob in the I-world can sim-
ulate an arbitrary U -world protocol in which the initial
state of C is G-invariant. They carry out the simulation
by passing the reference system R back and forth along
with C, each taking turns applying invariant operations
to RC. Similarly, in our analysis of cheating in Sec. III,
we allowed the k cheaters to pass the reference system R
among themselves as needed during the execution of the
protocol. A reference system that travels from place to
place might be called itinerant.
Here we will briefly discuss an alternative scenario, in
which the parties share a distributed reference system —
each party holds a fixed portion of this system through-
out the execution of the protocol. This discussion is not
actually needed for our analysis of security, but it is help-
ful nonetheless for understanding the physics of supers-
election rules. Indeed, in many physical situations in
which reference systems are used (e.g., in optical physics),
the system is distributed rather than itinerant.
Let A denote Alice’s part of the reference system, B
denote Bob’s part, and suppose that at the start of the
protocol AB is prepared in the state
|0〉AB = 1√
nG
∑
φ∈G
|φ〉A ⊗ |φ〉B . (45)
This state has trivial total charge; indeed, when ex-
pressed in the Fourier-transformed charge-eigenstate ba-
sis, it is
|0〉AB = 1√
nG
∑
q,i,a
|q¯, i, a〉A ⊗ |q, i, a〉B . (46)
Thus, in principle Alice (say) could prepare |0〉AB in her
lab and then ship half of it to Bob. (The state |0〉AB is
unnormalizable and unphysical if G is a Lie group. For
now we will suppose that G is a finite group, but we will
comment on the case of a Lie group below.)
In the state |0〉AB, Alice’s condensate, and Bob’s, have
values that are distributed uniformly over the group G,
but these values are locked together. Therefore, if |ψ〉C is
any pure state of C, then M invAC and M
inv
BC act on |0〉AB ⊗
|ψ〉C in the same way:
M invAC
(|0〉AB ⊗ |ψ〉C) =M invBC(|0〉AB ⊗ |ψ〉C)
1√
nG
∑
φ∈G
|φ〉A ⊗ |φ〉B ⊗
(
U(φ)MU(φ)−1
)|ψ〉C .
(47)
Furthermore M invAC and M
inv
BC act identically on any state
of the form
|Ψ〉ABC = 1√
nG
∑
φ∈G
|φ〉A ⊗ |φ〉B ⊗ |ψφ〉C , (48)
where |ψφ〉C might depend on φ, a form that is main-
tained as successive invariant operations are applied to
AC and to BC. Therefore, the outcome of the protocol
would be the same if each invariant operation M invBC ap-
plied to BC were replaced by the corresponding invari-
ant operation M invAC applied to AC. We conclude that
the simulation in which the distributed reference system
AB is prepared in the initial state |0〉AB is equivalent
to a simulation that uses an itinerant reference system
A. Since this latter simulation has all of the properties
listed in Sec. II C, we find that a bipartite I-world proto-
col using the distributed reference system can faithfully
simulate an arbitrary U -world protocol.
Note that the distributed state can serve the same pur-
pose if there is a fixed offset of Bob’s condensate relative
to Alice’s, as long as the offset is known. That is, if Alice
and Bob share the state
|0, φ˜〉AB = 1√
nG
∑
φ∈G
|φ〉A ⊗ |φφ˜〉B
=
1√
nG
∑
q,a,b
Dqab(φ˜)
(∑
i
|q¯, i, a〉A ⊗ |q, i, b〉B
)
,
(49)
then the invariant operations M invBC and(
U(φ˜)MU(φ˜)−1
)inv
AC
act in the same way. If Bob
knows φ˜, then, he can participate successfully in the
simulation by “twisting” his operations appropriately.
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Similarly, in a protocol with k parties, the distributed
reference state
|0〉k parties = 1√
nG
∑
φ∈G
|φ〉R1 ⊗ |φ〉R2 · · · ⊗ |φ〉Rk (50)
provides a common “phase standard” for all the partic-
ipants, allowing them to simulate a U -world protocol in
the I-world — the ℓth party simulates the noninvariant
operation M by applying M inv to the target system and
her part Rℓ of the reference system. Again, the parties
can twist their local operations to compensate for known
relative offsets of their condensates, if necessary.
In the state |0〉AB, there is a quantum correlation be-
tween Alice’s condensate and Bob’s. A common reference
standard can be provided instead by a classically corre-
lated state such as
ρAB =
1
nG
∑
φ∈G
(|φ〉〈φ|)
A
⊗ (|φ〉〈φ|)
B
. (51)
If Alice and Bob are equipped with the state ρAB, then
again M invAC and M
inv
BC act in the same way; hence they
can use this distributed reference state to simulate a U -
world protocol in the I-world. The state is G-invariant,
but unlike |0〉AB it is not a charge eigenstate; rather it is
a mixture of (invariant) states with various charges. For
example, in the case G = U(1), |0〉AB is the (unnormal-
izable) state
|0〉AB =
∫ 2π
0
|θ〉A ⊗ |θ〉B =
∞∑
q=−∞
| − q〉A ⊗ |q〉B ; (52)
Alice’s charge and Bob’s charge are perfectly anticorre-
lated. In contrast, ρAB is
ρAB ∝
∫
dθ (|θ〉〈θ|)A ⊗ (|θ〉〈θ|)B
∝
∑
qA,qB ,q
|qA, qB〉〈qA − q, qB + q| . (53)
Formally, this state appears to be separable, as it is a
mixture of the product states |θ〉 ⊗ |θ〉, but this is de-
ceptive, because |θ〉 ⊗ |θ〉 is not G-invariant and is there-
fore incompatible with the superselection rule. On the
other hand, in the charge-eigenstate basis, ρAB can be
expressed as a mixture of G-invariant pure states, each
with a definite total charge; however, these pure states
are highly entangled, with an indefinite value of Alice’s
(and Bob’s) local charge. The state ρAB is not a mix-
ture of invariant product states, and therefore cannot
be prepared without quantum communication between
Alice and Bob. Classical communication alone is insuffi-
cient for Alice and Bob to establish their common phase
standard.
Now let’s return to the question we postponed earlier:
what if G is a Lie group, so that the states |0〉AB and
ρAB are unnormalizable? To be specific, consider again
the case G = U(1), and suppose that Alice and Bob are
instructed to perform this protocol: Alice is presented
with a charge-zero state |0〉. She is instructed to ro-
tate this state to the superposition of charge eigenstates
(|0〉+ |1〉) /√2 and to send the resulting state to Bob.
Bob is to perform an orthogonal measurement in the ba-
sis (|0〉 ± |1〉) /√2 and so verify that Alice prepared the
correct state. To make sense of this procedure, Alice and
Bob must share a common reference state that serves to
lock together their phase conventions; for example, this
state could be a shared pure state |ψ〉AB with definite to-
tal charge. Alice’s coherent operation on system C acts
as
|ψ〉AB ⊗ |0〉C →
1√
2
(|ψ〉AB ⊗ |0〉C + (U−)A |ψ〉AB ⊗ |1〉C) ; (54)
that is, Alice simulates the charge-nonconserving oper-
ator (U+)C by applying the invariant operator (U−)A ⊗
(U+)C to AC. When Bob receives system C, he performs
his measurement by first simulating the transformation
|0〉C → 1√
2
(|0〉C + |1〉C) ,
|1〉C → 1√
2
(|0〉C − |1〉C) , (55)
and then measuring the charge of C. After Bob’s first
step, the state of ABC has become
1
2
(
IA ⊗ IB + (U−)A ⊗ (U+)B
)|ψ〉AB ⊗ |0〉C
+
1
2
(
IA ⊗ (U−)B − (U−)A ⊗ IB
)|ψ〉AB ⊗ |1〉C .(56)
When Bob measures the charge, the probability that he
obtains the outcome 1 and fails to verify Alice’s state, is
P1 =
1
2
(
1−Re AB〈ψ|(U−)A ⊗ (U+)B |ψ〉AB
)
. (57)
If, for example, the shared reference state is
|ψ〉AB = 1√
N
(
N−1∑
q=0
| − q〉A ⊗ |q〉B
)
, (58)
a normalizable approximation to the state |0〉AB, our ex-
pression for P1 becomes
P1 =
1
2N
. (59)
Thus, for finite N , the state received by Bob does not
match perfectly with the state prepared by Alice — the
superposition of charge eigenstates decoheres slightly.
But this decoherence becomes negligible in the limit
N → ∞, where the “charge fluctuations” of the shared
condensate are large.
11
The lesson we learn from this example generalizes to
nonabelian compact Lie groups. We can replace the un-
normalizable state
|0〉AB = 1√
nG
∑
q,i,a
|q¯, i, a〉A ⊗ |q, i, a〉B (60)
by a normalizable state with a truncated sum over the
charge q. If Alice and Bob use this truncated distributed
reference state to simulate a U -world protocol, their sim-
ulation will not have perfect fidelity. But as long as all
operations applied by Alice and Bob change the charge
by a bounded amount, the fidelity can be arbitrarily close
to one if the reference state is chosen appropriately. If
Alice and Bob are permitted to use a truncated itiner-
ant reference system rather than a distributed one, then
perfect fidelity can be achieved, as observed in Sec. II C.
V. INVARIANT OPERATIONS AND
COMMUTANTS
Our observations in Sec. II B emphasized the similari-
ties between abelian and nonabelian superselection rules,
enabling us to formulate a security analysis in Sec. III
that applies to both abelian and nonabelian symmetry
groups. But in several respects the arguments in Sec. III
are still not adequate. For one thing, so far we have
treated only the special case of superselection sectors la-
beled by unitary irreducible representations of compact
groups. For another, while it is possible to formulate
a security analysis of quantum bit commitment within
the framework of our argument in Sec. III, it is more
natural to structure the argument differently, following
more closely the standard analysis of quantum bit com-
mitment.
In this section, we will emphasize the essential dif-
ferences between superselection rules arising from non-
abelian symmetry groups and those arising from abelian
groups. The discussion will pave the way for our analysis
of quantum bit commitment in Sec. VII and of general
two-party protocols in Sec. VIII.
A crucial difference between abelian and nonabelian
charges is that nonabelian charges are nonadditive: the
charges of two subsystems A and B do not necessary de-
termine the charge of the composite system AB. This
feature can be restated as a property of the algebra of
observables of the bipartite system. Let A denote the
algebra of local operators (an associative algebra, closed
under Hermitian conjugation, that commutes with all lo-
cally conserved charges) acting on subsystem A, and let
B denote the algebra of local operators acting on B. The
commutant of A, denoted A′, is the algebra of operators
acting on the composite system AB that commute with
everything in A, and similarly for B′. Now, if all super-
selection rules are abelian, then A′ = B and B′ = A.
But if the superselection rules are nonabelian, the theory
has sectors with nontrivial total charge in which this re-
lation does not hold. This unusual structure of the local
observables has potential implications for the security of
quantum protocols.
To be more explicit, suppose that the superselection
rules arise from a nonabelian symmetry group G, and the
operations that Alice (or Bob) can perform must com-
mute with G. A state |ψ〉 in Alice’s (or Bob’s) Hilbert
space can be decomposed into irreducible representations
of G, as
|ψ〉 =
∑
q,i,a
ψqi,a|q, i, a〉 ; (61)
here q labels the irreducible representation (or “charge”),
i is the “color” index acted upon by the representation of
G, and a is the “flavor” index that distinguishes among
the various copies of the irreducible representation q ap-
pearing in the decomposition. Note that since we are
no longer assuming that Alice’s system transforms as the
regular representation of G, there need be no connection
between the number of flavors and the number of colors
associated with q. The action of a color gauge rotation
representing g ∈ G on |ψ〉 is
U(g)|ψ〉 =
∑
q,i,j,a
ψqi,a|q, j, a〉Dqji(g) . (62)
An operatorM allowed by the superselection rule, which
must commute with each Dq(g), preserves the charge q
and acts only on the flavor index according to
M |ψ〉 =
∑
q,i,a,b
ψqi,a|q, i, b〉M qba . (63)
Since allowed operations act nontrivially only on the fla-
vor index, it is convenient to use a notation that sup-
presses the color index i. We denote by Hq the invariant
Hilbert space in the charge-q sector, spanned by states
|q, a〉 that are labeled only by the flavor a within the sec-
tor. The corresponding operator algebra respecting the
superselection rule is L(Hq), spanned by linear operators
acting on this invariant space. Thus Alice’s invariant
Hilbert space is
HA =
⊕
q
HA,q (64)
and Alice’s local operator algebra is
A =
⊕
q
L(HA,q) ; (65)
Similarly, Bob’s operator algebra is
B =
⊕
q
L(HB,q) . (66)
Now consider the composite system AB. Its invariant
Hilbert space too can be expressed as a direct sum over
charge sectors
H =
⊕
q
Hq , (67)
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while the full operator algebra is ⊕qL(Hq). But we
should consider howHq is related to the invariant Hilbert
spaces of the subsystems. The charge-q Hilbert space of
the joint system can be expressed as
Hq =
⊕
qA,qB
HA,qA ⊗HB,qB ⊗ V qA,qBq , (68)
where V qA,qBq denotes the space of invariant linear maps
from the irreducible representation q to the tensor prod-
uct of irreducible representations qA ⊗ qB. This space
can be nontrivial (of dimension greater than one) if the
tensor product contains the representation q more than
once.
When expressed in terms of a particular color basis for
the irreducible representations q, qA and qB , the com-
ponents of V qA,qBq are the Clebsch-Gordon coefficients
(3j symbols), of the group G. Let {|qA, i〉} denote an
orthonormal basis for the representation qA, {|qB, j〉} a
basis for qB , and {|q(α), k〉} a basis for q(α), where the
index α labels the various copies of the representation q
that may be contained in qA⊗ qB. Then the components
of V qA,qBq are[
V qA,qBq (α)
]ij
k
=
(〈qA, i| ⊗ 〈qB , j|)|q(α), k〉 . (69)
These components comprise a G-invariant tensor with
the property[
V qA,qBq (α)
]ij
k
=
∑
i′,j′,k′
DqAii′ (g)D
qB
jj′ (g)
[
V qA,qBq (α)
]i′j′
k′
Dqk′k(g) .(70)
Invariant operations act not on the color indices of[
V qA,qBq (α)
]ij
k
, but rather on the index α that distin-
guishes the flavors of q contained in qA ⊗ qB. Further-
more, the invariant operations can also alter the charges
qA and qB appearing in eq. (68), while preserving the
total charge q.
The notation of eq. (68) and its implications may be
clarified by discussing specific examples. The trivial rep-
resentation (q = 1) is contained only in the tensor prod-
uct of qA with its conjugate representation q¯A, and it
occurs only once in this product; Therefore, in the case
where the total charge is q = 1, eq. (68) reduces to
H1 =
⊕
q
HA,q ⊗HB,q¯ ; (71)
in this case, the factor V qA,qBq is superfluous. Now, the
joint operator algebra contains operations that cannot
be executed by Alice and Bob locally — these opera-
tions change Alice’s charge and Bob’s while preserving
the total charge (of course, this can happen even if G is
abelian). But any operation that commutes with Alice’s
algebra A must preserve Alice’s charge q, and act triv-
ially in each of Alice’s charge sectors; such operations
preserve Bob’s charge q¯ as well, and thus are in Bob’s
algebra B. Therefore A and B are commutants of one
another.
However, if the total charge is nontrivial, then B need
not be the commutant of A. To illustrate this phe-
nomenon, consider the case G = SU(2), where the ir-
reducible representation is labeled by the spin j. For
SU(2), V jA,jBj is always one (or zero) dimensional, and
eq. (68) reduces to
Hj =
⊕
jA,jB
HA,jA ⊗HB,jB , (72)
where it is implicit that each product of representations
appearing on the right-hand side transforms as spin j. To
be concrete, suppose that Alice’s system has spin 1/2,
Bob’s contains both a spin-0 and a spin-1 component,
and the total spin is 1/2; then
H1/2 = HA,1/2 ⊗ (HB,0 ⊕HB,1) . (73)
Note that in this case, contrary to the case in which the
total charge is trivial, a single value of jA can be com-
bined with either of two different values of jB to ob-
tain the same total charge j. Therefore, there are invari-
ant operations acting on the joint system that preserve
Alice’s charge and the total charge, but change Bob’s
charge. These operations are in the commutant of A but
not in B; hence A′ 6= B.
We arrive at another way of looking at this property of
H1/2 if we imagine that there is a third party Charlie who
holds a compensating charge, so that the total charge is
trivial. Now
H0 = HA,1/2⊗
(HB,0 ⊗HC,1/2 ⊕HB,1 ⊗HC,1/2) ; (74)
an operation in A′ can be performed by Bob and Charlie
acting together, but not by Bob alone.
In order that A′ 6= B, it is not necessary for one of
the parties to possess a state with indefinite charge. For
example, in the case G = SU(3), the tensor product of
the irreducible octet representation 8 with itself contains
two copies of 8, one symmetric and one antisymmetric
under interchange of the factors:
8A ⊗ 8B ⊇ 8sym ⊕ 8anti . (75)
Thus, in the decomposition
H8 = HA,8 ⊗HB,8 ⊗ V 8,88 , (76)
the joint invariant Hilbert space is two-dimensional, while
Alice and Bob both have one-dimensional Hilbert spaces
and trivial invariant operator algebras. Then A′ is the
full operator algebra, clearly different from B, and sim-
ilarly B′ is different from A. Again, an alternative de-
scription of the invariant space is to note that Charlie
could hold a compensating 8 charge, in which case the
total charge is trivial and
H1 = (HA,8 ⊗HB,8 ⊗HC,8)⊗ V 8,8,81 (77)
13
is two-dimensional.
For the purpose of describingG-invariant operations, it
is always legitimate to introduce a compensating charge
without incurring any loss of generality. To see this, first
note that if E is a G-invariant quantum operation, then
E[U(g)ρU(g)−1] = U(g)E(ρ)U(g)−1 (78)
for any g ∈ G and any state ρ. In particular, then,
E[G(ρ)] = G[E(ρ)] , (79)
where G is the map
G(ρ) = 1
nG
∑
g∈G
U(g)ρU(g)−1 , (80)
which induces decoherence of a superposition of distinct
irreducible representations of G:
G(|q, i, a〉〈q′, j, b|)
= δqq
′
δij
(
1
nq
∑
l
|q, l, a〉〈q, l, b|
)
. (81)
Eq. (79) means [26] that the state
|ψ〉 =
∑
i,a
ψqi,a|q, i, a〉 (82)
cannot be distinguished by any G-invariant operation
from the state
G(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = ∑
q,a,b,i
ψqi,aψ
q ∗
i,b
 1
nq
∑
j
|q, j, a〉〈q, j, b|
 .(83)
Now, consider a system A whose charge is screened by
a system C, so that the state of the joint system has
trivial total charge:
|ψ〉AC =
∑
q,a,i
ψqa |q, i, a〉A ⊗ |q¯, i〉C . (84)
Tracing over system C produces the state
trC
(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
AC
=
∑
q,a,b
ψqaψ
q ∗
b
 1
nq
∑
j
|q, j, a〉〈q, j, b|
 .(85)
But the state eq. (83) is just a convex combination of
states of the form eq. (85). Therefore, if only G-invariant
operations are to be considered, it is always harmless to
replace system A by half of a bipartite state that carries
trivial total charge.
Up until now, we have explicitly discussed only the case
of superselection sectors arising from a compact symme-
try group, but much of the formalism we have outlined
in this section can be extended to a more general set-
ting. Whatever the origin of the superselection rule, the
allowed operations act on a suitable invariant space. Sec-
tors can still be classified by conserved charges, but in the
general case, the space V qA,qBq is defined more abstractly,
rather than in terms of group representations. One im-
portant property that continues to hold in the general
setting (which will play a central role in our analysis of
quantum bit commitment in Sec. VII and of general two-
party games in Sec. VIII) is that for each value q of the
charge, there is a unique conjugate charge q¯ such that the
fusion of the charges contains the trivial charge sector.
VI. DATA HIDING
Verstraete and Cirac [13] described a data-hiding pro-
tocol whose security is founded on the charge superse-
lection rule for G = U(1). Suppose that a trusted third
party Charlie prepares one of the two orthogonal states
|±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉) , (86)
where |0〉 and |1〉 denote states of charge 0 and 1 respec-
tively, and distributes half to Alice and half to Bob. If
Alice and Bob could each measure the Pauli operator X
that interchanges |0〉 and |1〉, they could distinguish the
states |+〉 and |−〉 by performing these measurements
and comparing their outcomes. However, X does not
commute with the electric charge Q; if Alice and Bob are
permitted only to perform local charge-conserving oper-
ations and to communicate classically, then they will be
powerless to distinguish the two possible states.
On the other hand, if Alice and Bob share access to a
common phase reference state, their activities will be un-
restricted and nothing will prevent them from performing
the X measurements that unlock the classical bit stored
in the state prepared by Charlie (aside from the small
loss of fidelity that arises if the reference state has large
but finite charge fluctuations, as in eq. (58)). In Bloch
sphere language, Alice and Bob have no a priori means of
orienting their measurement axes in the x-y plane, but a
shared phase standard enables them to lock their axes to-
gether and compare their measurements. Since the state
prepared by Charlie is invariant under rotations about
the z axis, the overall orientation in the x-y plane is ir-
relevant; only the relative orientation needs to be fixed
to identify Charlie’s state.
To be more explicit, while X does not commute with
the charge,
X invAA′ = (U−)A ⊗ σ+A′ + (U+)A ⊗ σ−A′ (87)
commutes with Q, as does X invBB′ . If Alice and Bob share
a distributed reference state |ψ〉AB that is an eigenstate
of (U−)A ⊗ (U+)B with eigenvalue 1, then
|ψ〉AB ⊗ |±〉A′B′ (88)
is an eigenstate of
X invAA′ ⊗X invBB′ (89)
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with eigenvalue ±1. Therefore, Alice and Bob can un-
lock the hidden bit by each measuring X inv and com-
paring their results. The same holds, of course, if the
shared reference state ρAB is a mixture of eigenstates of
(U−)A⊗(U+)B, each with eigenvalue 1, as in eq. (53). As
Verstraete and Cirac observed [13], quantum communi-
cation is needed to establish this shared phase standard.
In the absence of a shared phase standard, neither Al-
ice nor Bob can detect the bit encoded in the state |±〉
of eq. (86); however, either Alice or Bob can manipulate
the bit. Each can measure the charge q, and either can
apply a phase to the state conditioned on the charge,
flipping |+〉 ↔ |−〉. But the property that B′ 6= A indi-
cates that the situation can be more subtle in the non-
abelian case (with nontrivial total charge). Suppose, for
example, that G = SU(2) with total charge j = 1/2
as in eq. (73). Two states with the same value of the
total charge and of Alice’s charge, but different values
of Bob’s charge, are |j = 1/2, jA = 1/2, jB = 0〉 and
|j = 1/2, jA = 1/2, jB = 1〉. Charlie might prepare ei-
ther of the linear combinations
|±〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣j = 1
2
, jA =
1
2
, jB = 0
〉
±
∣∣j = 1
2
, jA =
1
2
, jB = 1
〉)
, (90)
and then distribute the AB system to Alice and Bob.
Again, neither Alice nor Bob can detect the hidden bit,
but now there is a notable asymmetry between Alice’s
power and Bob’s. Since Bob has a superposition of two
different charge states, he can tamper with the hidden bit
by applying a phase controlled by the charge. Alice, on
the other hand, has a trivial invariant operator algebra,
and has no control over the shared state.
We may take this observation a step further. Suppose,
for example, that G = SU(3) with total charge q = 8
as in eq. (76). Charlie might prepare either of the linear
combinations
|±〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣q = 8sym, qA = 8, qB = 8〉
±
∣∣q = 8anti, qA = 8, qB = 8〉) , (91)
and then distribute the AB system to Alice and Bob.
Again, neither Alice nor Bob can detect the hidden bit,
but furthermore, neither one can tamper with the bit’s
value.
However, in the nonabelian case as in the abelian case,
the hidden bit can be opened via local operations and
classical communication between Alice and Bob if they
are provided with correlated reference systems that effec-
tively remove the restrictions imposed by the superselec-
tion rule.
VII. QUANTUM BIT COMMITMENT AND
SUPERSELECTION RULES
During the commitment stage of quantum bit com-
mitment, Alice encodes a classical bit by preparing one
of two distinguishable quantum states with density op-
erators ρ0 or ρ1, and then she sends half of the state
to Bob. In the unveiling stage, Alice sends the other
half of the state to Bob, so that he can verify whether
the state is ρ0 or ρ1. The protocol is binding if, after
commitment, Alice is unable to change the value of the
bit. The protocol is concealing if, after commitment and
before unveiling, Bob is unable to discern the value of
the bit. The protocol is secure if it is both binding and
concealing.
In the absence of superselection rules, unconditionally
secure quantum bit commitment is impossible [8, 9]. If we
imagine that the states ρ0 and ρ1 are pure states shared
by Alice and Bob, then if the protocol is concealing, Bob’s
density operator (obtained by tracing over Alice’s sys-
tem) must be the same in both cases: ρ0,B = ρ1,B. But
then by the HJW Theorem [29] Alice can apply a unitary
transformation to her half of the state that transforms ρ0
to ρ1, so that the protocol is not binding.
A. Bit commitment with mixed states
We reached this conclusion under the assumption that
ρ0 and ρ1 are pure states, but we can extend the argu-
ment to the case were the states are mixed by appealing
to the concept of a purification of a mixed state. We will
describe this extension in detail, as we will follow very
similar reasoning in our discussion in Sec. VIIC of bit
commitment with nontrivial total charge.
Suppose that at the start of the bit commitment proto-
col, Alice and Bob share a product state ρA⊗ ρB, where
the states ρA and ρB are mixed. An equivalent way to
describe Alice’s initial state is to introduce the ancilla
system C and a pure state |ψ〉AC (a purification of ρA),
such that the density operator ρA is obtained from |ψ〉AC
by tracing over system C:
ρA = trC
(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
AC
. (92)
Similarly, to describe ρB we can introduce the ancilla D
and a state |ϕ〉BD that purifies ρB. Without loss of gen-
erality, we may assume that in each step of the protocol,
Alice or Bob applies a unitary transformation, so that
the state of the full system ABCD remains pure. (A
general quantum operation performed by Alice, say, can
be realized as a unitary transformation applied jointly to
Alice’s system and to an appropriate ancilla; therefore,
the operation is unitary provided that we include this
ancilla as part of the system.) In particular, after the bit
is committed, the state of the full system is one of the
two pure states |ψ0〉ABCD or |ψ1〉ABCD.
If both parties are honest, the ancillas C and D are
off limits — Alice can manipulate only A and Bob can
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manipulate only B — and in that case the mixed state
protocol and its purification are completely equivalent.
Furthermore, if one party cheats, whether the other party
starts out with a mixed state or its purification has no
impact on the effectiveness of the cheating strategy, be-
cause the honest party never touches the purifying ancilla
anyway.
Now let us see that in any quantum bit commitment
protocol, one of the players can cheat successfully. First
suppose that Bob cheats. Though the honest protocol
calls for Bob to start our with the mixed state ρB, a
cheating Bob can throw this state away, and replace it
with the purification |ϕ〉BD, where D is now an ancilla
system that Bob controls. Therefore, if the protocol is
perfectly concealing (even when Bob cheats), then
ρ0,BD ≡ trAC
(|ψ0〉〈ψ0|)ABCD
= ρ1,BD ≡ trAC
(|ψ1〉〈ψ1|)ABCD ; (93)
Bob is unable to collect any information about the com-
mitted bit through any joint measurement on BD.
Similarly, a cheating Alice could throw away her initial
state and replace it by its purification; then Alice could
control both A and the ancilla C. Applying the HJW
theorem as before, we conclude that if ρ0,BD = ρ1,BD,
then Alice can apply a unitary transformation to AC that
transforms |ψ0〉ABCD to |ψ1〉ABCD. We conclude that if
the protocol is concealing, then it is not binding. Uncon-
ditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible,
even with mixed states. That quantum bit commitment
is impossible even when mixed strategies are used was
proved in [8] using a slightly different approach.
B. Trivial total charge
The argument in Sec. VIIA shows that for an analy-
sis of the security of quantum bit commitment, we may
assume that Alice and Bob share a pure state. But how
is the security affected if superselection rules constrain
Alice’s and Bob’s operations? We will first consider the
special case in which the total charge that Alice and Bob
share is trivial. After commitment, then, Alice and Bob
share one of the two pure states |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉, each with
trivial total charge. Choosing the Schmidt basis in each
charge sector, the state |ψ0〉 can be expanded as
|ψ0〉AB =
∑
q
√
pq
∑
b
√
λq,b |q¯, b〉A ⊗ |q, b〉B . (94)
where Bob’s density operator is
ρ0,B = trA (|ψ0〉〈ψ0|) =
∑
q
pq ρ0,B,q (95)
and
ρ0,B,q =
∑
b
λq,b |q, b〉〈q, b| . (96)
Bob can measure the probability pq that his charge is q;
therefore if the protocol is concealing then the distribu-
tion {pq} must be the same for |ψ1〉 as for |ψ0〉. Further-
more, Bob’s density operator in the charge-q sector must
not depend on whether the state is |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉; therefore
|ψ1〉 can be expanded as
|ψ1〉AB =
∑
q
√
pq
∑
b
√
λq,b |q¯, b˜〉A ⊗ |q, b〉B , (97)
where {|q¯, b˜〉A} is another basis for Alice’s charge-q¯ sec-
tor. But now Alice can apply a unitary transformation
conditioned on the charge that rotates one basis to the
other:
Uq¯ : |q¯, b〉 → |q¯, b˜〉 , (98)
which transforms |ψ0〉 to |ψ1〉. Therefore, the protocol is
not binding.
Obviously, the same argument applies, in the abelian
case, even if the total charge is nontrivial [16]. The key
property of the states that is used in the argument is that
Alice’s charge is perfectly correlated with Bob’s, so that
B′ = A.
C. Nontrivial total charge
The property that B′ 6= A in the nonabelian case (with
nontrivial total charge) encourages one to hope that a bit
commitment protocol can be formulated whose security
is founded on a nonabelian superselection rule. Indeed,
consider again the case G = SU(2) with total charge
j = 1/2 as in eq. (73). When Alice has control of the full
AB system, she can prepare either of the states |±〉AB
shown in eq. (90), and then she can send the B sys-
tem to Bob. Now Bob is unable to distinguish the two
states, because he cannot measure the relative phase in
a superposition of two states of different charge. Fur-
thermore there is no invariant operation Alice can apply
that changes |+〉 to |−〉 or vice versa. It seems, then,
that the protocol is both concealing and binding! At
any rate, quantum bit commitment in a world with non-
abelian superselection rules seems fundamentally differ-
ent than quantum bit commitment in a world in which
all superselection rules are abelian.
But, as always in a discussion of information-theoretic
security, we must be sure to consider the most general
possible cheating strategies. And in fact, we can argue
that for the security analysis, there is no loss of generality
if we assume that the charge shared by the parties is
trivial, the case we have already dealt with in Sec. VII B.
This reduction to the case of trivial total charge follows
closely our discussion in Sec. VII A, where we showed
that it suffices to assume that the parties share a pure
state.
Consider a general two-party quantum bit commit-
ment protocol in which the initial state shared by Alice
and Bob is a tensor product ρA ⊗ ρB of invariant states.
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FIG. 2: “Purification” of a two-party game with nontriv-
ial total charge. At the beginning of the game, the charge
of C (hidden behind a brick wall) compensates for Alice’s
charge qA, and the charge of D (also hidden) compensates for
Bob’s charge qB . Honest players never touch the compensat-
ing charges, but a cheating Alice might manipulate C and a
cheating Bob might manipulate D.
The state ρA can be purified if we introduce an ancilla
C; furthermore, the pure state of AC can be chosen to
have trivial total charge. Similar, we can purify ρB us-
ing the ancilla D, in such a way that the pure state of
BD has trivial total charge. (See Fig. 2.) Each oper-
ation performed by Alice or Bob can be taken to be a
charge-conserving unitary transformation; therefore, at
each stage of the protocol, the state of the full system
ABCD is a pure state with trivial total charge.
In the honest protocol, the ancillas C and D are inac-
cessible. But if Bob cheats, he can throw away the initial
invariant state ρA called for in the protocol, and replace
it by a trivially charged pure state of BD, where D is
now an ancilla that Bob controls. Therefore, if the bit
commitment protocol is concealing, then ρ0,BD = ρ1,BD
— Bob can’t learn anything about the committed bit
from any invariant joint measurement on BD. Since the
state of the full system ABCD is a pure state with triv-
ial charge, the argument of Sec. VII B suffices to show
that Alice can transform |ψ0〉 to |ψ1〉 with an invariant
local operation applied to AC. Hence, the protocol is not
binding. We have proved, then, that, even when the pro-
tocol calls for a nontrivial total charge, if Bob is unable
to cheat then Alice can cheat — unconditionally secure
quantum bit commitment is impossible. We have:
Theorem 2 Consider a quantum bit commitment proto-
col in the I-world, where at the beginning of the protocol
Alice and Bob share a product of invariant states. Then
if the protocol is concealing, it is not binding.
Our proof, which reduces the case of nontrivial total
charge to the case of trivial total charge, is really just
a minor variant of the argument in Sec. VII A that re-
duces the case of a protocol where Alice and Bob share
a mixed state to the case where they share a pure state.
In the case of our bit commitment protocol in which
the total charge of AB is j = 1/2, if Alice is unable to
access the compensating charge in C, then she can’t cheat
successfully. But if Alice controls the whole AC system,
then Alice’s charge jAC = 0, 1 is perfectly correlated with
Bob’s, and she can rotate the relative phase of the jAC =
0 and jAC = 1 components of her state, transforming |+〉
to |−〉.
This reduction of a protocol with nontrivial total
charge to a protocol with trivial total charge can be gen-
eralized. In the I-world, consider an n-party protocol
in which up to k < n of the parties might cheat, where
the initial state is the product of invariant states ⊗ni=1ρi,
and where all operations performed by the parties are re-
quired to conserve the local charge. Then we may imag-
ine that each party is issued a compensating charge at
the beginning of the protocol, so that each party actu-
ally starts out with trivial charge. The honest parties
will never touch their compensating charges, but a cheat-
ing party cannot be prevented from performing arbitrary
joint operations on her system and her compensating
charge. This strategy is realizable because the cheater
might throw away the invariant state she holds at the
beginning of the protocol, and replace it by a charge-zero
state that she controls fully. Furthermore, if an attack
by the cheaters is successful in the protocol where the
honest players start out with trivial charge, then it will
also be successful if the honest players start out with a
product of charged invariant states; since honest play-
ers never make use of the compensating charges, their
presence can have no impact on the effectiveness of the
attack. Therefore, we have:
Theorem 3 Let P be an n-party quantum protocol in the
I-world that securely realizes a task Π, where the initial
state in P is a product of n invariant states. Then there
is an I-world protocol P ′ that also securely realizes Π,
where the initial state in P ′ is a product of n pure states,
each with trivial charge.
In other words, in a security analysis, we may assume
without any loss of generality that each party holds a
pure state with trivial charge at the start of the protocol.
Note that for the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3, our ob-
servations from Sec. II and III on the use of reference
systems are not needed. Rather, to prove Theorems 2
and 3, we use only two properties of the I-world superse-
lection sectors: first, that for each charge sector Hq there
is a unique conjugate charge sector Hq¯ such that the triv-
ial sector H1 is contained in Hq ⊗ Hq¯, and second, that
any invariant state has a purification with trivial total
charge. These properties hold not just for the case of su-
perselection rules arising from a symmetry group G, but
also for the more general superselection rules considered
in Sec. VIII. Therefore, Theorems 2 and 3 apply in this
more general setting.
VIII. TWO-PARTY PROTOCOLS IN GENERAL
A. Overview
We will now analyze the impact of superselection rules
on the security of general two-party protocols. We will
show that for any protocol P in the invariant world
(I-world) subject to the superselection rule, there is a
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corresponding protocol P˜ in the unrestricted world (U -
world), where P˜ simulates P in the following sense: First,
when performed honestly, P˜ and P accomplish the same
task. And second, for any cheating strategy that can
be adopted by a dishonest party in P˜ , there is a corre-
sponding cheating strategy in P that is just as effective.
In particular then, if P˜ is insecure, then so is P . We
conclude, therefore, that superselection rules cannot en-
hance the (information-theoretic) security of two-party
protocols. The methods we will use to establish this re-
sult are quite different than those used in Sec. III to treat
the case of superselection rules arising from a symmetry
group.
Before going into the details, we will briefly describe
the main ideas used in our argument. First of all, we
will restrict out attention to a protocol in which the total
charge shared by the two parties is trivial (belongs to the
trivial superselection sector). We know from Theorem 3
in Sec. VIIC that it suffices to treat this special case in an
analysis of security. A protocol with trivial total charge
has this useful property: if Alice knows that she holds
charge q after sending a message to Bob, then Alice also
knows that Bob will hold the conjugate charge q¯ upon
receiving the message. Similarly, Bob knows what Alice’s
charge will be after she receives a message sent by Bob.
Our analysis of security relies on the property that Bob
has a definite charge if Alice does, and therefore it applies
only to two-party protocols.
In the I-world, charge is conserved, so that the total
charge shared by Alice and Bob is trivial at each stage of
the protocol; furthermore, local operations performed by
Alice or Bob must preserve the conserved charge. In the
U -world, charge need not be conserved, but the protocol
P˜ that simulates the I-world protocol P can be chosen to
respect conservation of a fictitious “charge” that behaves
like the actual conserved charge of the I-world. How-
ever, a dishonest party who is not bound to follow the
protocol P˜ can perform operations that violate “charge”
conservation. Our task is to ensure that the greater free-
dom enjoyed by a dishonest party in the U -world does
not enhance her ability to cheat successfully.
For this purpose, our argument relies on the concept of
the format of a message exchanged between the parties.
In the U -world, the format is simply the Hilbert space
containing the message. In the protocol P˜ , the recipient
of a message always checks that the format of the message
is valid, and aborts the protocol if the message is invalid.
A valid message corresponds to one that could have been
sent in the I-world, while a message is invalid only if the
sender violated the local conservation of “charge” before
sending it. Thus, a message that upon receipt is found to
be in the proper format could have been sent by a party
who performed a charge-conserving local operation — in
effect the sender is unable to play a charge nonconserving
strategy without being detected. Since effective charge
conservation is enforced by halting the protocol when a
charge nonconservation is detected, it will be essential
for our argument to consider games that can be aborted
at any stage by either party. A cheating strategy for the
I-world protocol P and the corresponding cheating strat-
egy for its U -world counterpart P˜ will cause the game to
halt prematurely with the same probability, as well as
produce the same probability distribution of outcomes in
the event that the game ends normally, without being
aborted.
B. Superselection rules and charges
Before proceeding to our proof, we should recall the
properties of superselection rules and charges that will
be invoked in the argument. These properties have been
explored already in Sec. V, for the special case of super-
selection sectors labeled by irreducible unitary represen-
tations of compact groups. Here we wish to emphasize
that some of the same ideas can be extended to a more
general setting, and we will indicate how a two-party pro-
tocol in which conserved charges are exchanged can be
simulated using ordinary qubits.
In general, a superselection rule is a decomposition of
Hilbert space into a direct sum of sectors such that each
sector is preserved by the allowed operations. The charge
q is a label that distinguishes the distinct sectors, and we
may say that the operations allowed by the superselec-
tion rule conserve the charge. Thus, the Hilbert space is
expressed as
H =
⊕
q
Hq , (99)
and the allowed operations belong to the algebra⊕
q
L (Hq) , (100)
where L (Hq) denotes linear operators acting on Hq.
Depending on the particular form of the superselection
rule, there are specific rules governing how the charge
behaves when a system splits into two subsystems, or
when two systems fuse to become a single system. These
rules can be encoded in vector spaces V a,bc defined by
Hc =
⊕
a,b
Ha ⊗Hb ⊗ V a,bc . (101)
The space V a,bc is n-dimensional if there are n distinguish-
able ways that a charge c object can arise when objects
with charges a and b fuse. Consistency of eq. (101) with
associativity of the tensor product requires the V a,bc ’s to
obey certain identities, but we will not discuss these fur-
ther as they will not be needed for our proof.
There is a trivial-charge sector, denoted H1, that be-
haves as the identity under fusion:
Hc ⊗H1 = Hc . (102)
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Furthermore, there is a unique charge q¯, the conjugate of
q, that can fuse with q to yield the identity:
H1 =
⊕
q
Hq ⊗Hq¯ . (103)
Now, in the I-world, consider a bipartite system shared
by Alice and Bob. The Hilbert space decomposes as
H =
⊕
q
Hq ,
Hq =
⊕
qA,qB
HA,qA ⊗HB,qB ⊗ V qA,qBq , (104)
where q is the total charge, qA is the charge of Alice’s sys-
tem, and qB is the charge of Bob’s system. The physical
operations, allowed by the superselection rule, conserve
the total charge, and hence belong to the algebra
O =
⊕
q
L (Hq) . (105)
The operations Alice can perform, which conserve Alice’s
charge and act trivially on Bob’s system, belong to
A =
⊕
q,qA,qB
L (HA,qA)⊗ IqA,qBB,q , (106)
where IqA,qBB,q denotes the identity acting on HB,qB ⊗
V qA,qBq . Similarly, the algebra of operations that Bob
can perform is
B =
⊕
q,qA,qB
IqA,qBA,q ⊗ L (HB,qB ) , (107)
where IqA,qBA,q denotes the identity acting on HA,qA ⊗
V qA,qBq . In contrast, the commutant B′ of B, which con-
serves the total charge and Bob’s charge but need not
conserve Alice’s, is
B′ =
⊕
q,qB
L
(⊕
qA
HA,qA ⊗ V qA,qBq
)
⊗ IB,qB , (108)
where IB,qB is the identity on HB,qB , and similarly
A′ =
⊕
q,qA
IA,qA ⊗ L
(⊕
qB
HB,qB ⊗ V qA,qBq
)
. (109)
Thus A′ = B and B′ = A if and only if the charges
qA and qB are perfectly correlated (there is a unique qB
corresponding to each qA and vice versa). This condition
holds, in particular, if the total charge is trivial, in which
case our formulas simplify to
H = H1 =
⊕
q
HA,q ⊗HB,q¯ ,
A = B′ =
⊕
q
L (HA,q)⊗ IB,q¯ ,
B = A′ =
⊕
q
IA,q ⊗ L (HB,q¯) . (110)
C. Simulating charge exchange
A novelty of a two-party protocol in the I-world is
that when Alice (for example) sends a message to Bob,
she may choose to split the charge she possesses into two
parts — the charge she retains and the charge of the
message that she sends. If the total charge is trivial, then
the full Hilbert space comprising Alice’s system A, Bob’s
system B, and the message system M can be expressed
as
H1 =
⊕
qA,qB ,qM
HA,qA ⊗HB,qB ⊗HM,qM ⊗ V qA,qB ,qM1 .
(111)
The isomorphisms
V qA,qB ,qM1
∼= V qA,qMq¯B ∼= V qB ,qMq¯A (112)
invite us to interpret eq. (111) in complementary ways —
namely, the charge q¯B of AM is conjugate to the charge
qB of B, and the charge q¯A of BM is conjugate to the
charge qA of A. Thus, eq. (111) describes the splitting
of Alice’s initial charge q¯B into the charge qA that she
retains and the charge qM of the message, as well as the
fusion of the charge qM of the message with Bob’s initial
charge qB to yield Bob’s final charge q¯A. Furthermore, if
V qA,qB ,qM1 is of dimension greater than one, then a vector
in V qA,qB ,qM1 describes the particular manner in which
Alice performs the splitting, which in turn determines
the result of Bob’s fusion.
While the information encoded in V qA,qB ,qM1 is an in-
trinsic property in the I-world, if we are to simulate the
process of charge exchange in the U -world, then this in-
formation must be carried by ordinary qubits. In such
a simulation, the Hilbert space of Alice’s system, Bob’s
system, and the message is expanded to
H˜ =
⊕
q1,q2,qA,qB ,qM
HA,q1 ⊗HB,q2 ⊗HM,qM ⊗ V qA,qB ,qM1 ,
(113)
but where now V qA,qB ,qM1 is to be regarded as an ex-
plicit part of the message. If the conditions q1 = qA and
q2 = qB were imposed, then the “format” of this message
would coincide perfectly with the information content of
a message sent in the I-world. But while in the I-world
these conditions arise from the intrinsic physics of the su-
perselection rule, in the U -world they must be imposed
by hand through proper design of the protocol.
Thus, in the U -world protocol P˜ that simulates the
I-world protocol P , we will require the recipient of a
message to verify its format — Alice checks that q1 = qA
and Bob checks that q2 = qB. Of course, at a given stage
of the protocol P , Alice or Bob might hold a coherent
superposition of different charges, even though the total
charge is always guaranteed to be trivial. Therefore the
verification step in P˜ must be performed coherently; Al-
ice, for example, checks that q1 and qA match without
learning the value of q1 or qA. If verification fails, then
the message recipient has detected cheating by the other
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party and aborts the protocol. If verification succeeds,
then the message has been projected onto the valid for-
mat, and as far as the recipient is concerned, it is just as
though the message had been sent in the right format to
begin with.
Whenever Alice cheats in the U -world protocol P˜ by
modifying her charge, she risks detection, and if her
cheating is undetected, then her operation is equiva-
lent to a charge-conserving one. Therefore, Alice has an
equivalent strategy in the I-world protocol P , in which
she either halts the game herself with some probability
before sending her message, or if the game does not halt,
performs an operation allowed by the superselection rule.
This observation suffices to establish that P˜ simulates
P , and thus that the superselection rule cannot thwart
cheating.
To summarize, for the purpose of characterizing Alice’s
ability to cheat, we are only interested in how Alice’s
activities will affect Bob’s measurements. Although in
the U -world Alice has the power to violate conservation
of “charge,” she is unable to fool Bob into accepting a
message that is not isomorphic to one that could have
been created in the I-world. Therefore, Alice’s elevated
power in the U -world gives her no advantage.
D. Definitions
←−
←−
−→
Bob strategy
Alice strategy
Protocol
I-world U -world
B′ B˜′
A′ A˜′
P P˜
FIG. 3: The U -world protocol P˜ simulates the I-world pro-
tocol P if the honest protocols realize the same task, and if
for any cheating strategy in P˜ there is an equivalent cheating
strategy in P .
Having explained the main ideas, we will now present
a more formal proof of our result. To begin, we must de-
fine the general notions of “protocol” and “simulation”
in accord with our goals. The definitions are quite natu-
ral, but there are some technicalities that are necessary
for the proof to work.
We consider quantum games between two parties, Al-
ice and Bob. We assume that Alice sends the first mes-
sage and the players alternate. The protocol of a game
specifies the total number of messages, their format, the
strategies for honest players, and a way to determine the
game outcome. By “format” in the U -world we mean the
Hilbert space HM of a given message. In the I-world, we
specify the space HM,qM for each value of the message
charge qM .
To define an honest strategy in the I-world, we spec-
ify for each value of Alice’s charge qA her corresponding
space HA,qA ; likewise, we specify Bob’s space HB,qB for
each qB. The game starts with a pure state
|ξA〉 ⊗ |ξB〉 ∈ HA,1 ⊗HB,1, (114)
where 1 stands for the trivial charge. If one of the players
(say, Alice) cheats, she may use a different set of private
spaces H ′A,qA , but the initial state still must be of the
form |ξ′A〉 ⊗ |ξB〉, where |ξ′A〉 ∈ H′A,1.
Alice’s and Bob’s actions in the kth step are described
by operators WAk , WBk . The final outcome is deter-
mined by a pair of measurements that are performed in-
dependently on Alice’s and Bob’s subsystems at the end
of the game. We are interested in the joint probability
distribution of the measurement results. However, if one
of the players cheats, only the honest player’s subsystem
is measured.
For the reasons explained in Sec. VIII A, we will as-
sume that the game can be aborted by either player.
If the game is aborted, we will not need to keep track
of who ends the game or when it ends — we will only
be interested in whether the game ends normally and if
so what is the outcome. For this purpose the quantum
state can be characterized by a vector |ψ〉 such that 〈ψ|ψ〉
is the probability that the game has not been aborted.
Operations performed by each player may then be de-
scribed by contracting maps, i.e., operators W such that
W †W ≤ I. We assume that the game is never aborted if
both players are honest, so that the probabilities of dif-
ferent outcomes add up to 1 in the honest game. If one of
the players cheats, the total probability of all outcomes
is generally less than 1.
Now we define what it means for one protocol to sim-
ulate another (see Fig. 3):
Definition A protocol P˜ simulates the protocol P if the
following conditions are fulfilled:
1. The honest strategies in P and P˜ give rise to the
same probability distribution of the outcomes.
2. For any cheating strategy A˜′ by Alice compatible
with the protocol P˜ there exists an equivalent strat-
egy A′ for the protocol P . (“Equivalent” means that
Bob’s measurement result has the same probability
distribution in both cases.)
3. For any cheating strategy B˜′ by Bob compatible with
the protocol P˜ there is an equivalent strategy B′ for
the protocol P .
Note that when we say that the two cheating strategies
are equivalent we mean in particular that the probabil-
ity that the game ends normally is the same for both
strategies.
To better understand our concept of simulation it is
very helpful to consider this simple example: Suppose
that the message space HM of P is embedded in a larger
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space H˜M of P˜ . Honest players follow the same strate-
gies in P˜ as in P , so that condition 1 is obviously sat-
isfied. However, the players in P˜ must be prepared to
receive messages that do not obey the format of P , i.e.,
do not fit into the subspace HM . In P˜ such messages
are rejected, and the game is aborted. This rule prevents
a dishonest player from gaining any advantage (relative
to simply quitting the game) by sending an invalid mes-
sage. More formally, suppose that Alice cheats using
some strategy A˜′. In the corresponding strategy A′, Al-
ice projects her message system H˜M onto the subspace
HM , before sending each message. Thus if the strategy
A˜′ calls for Alice to apply the operator W˜ ′Ak in the kth
round, then in the strategy A′ Alice applies the contract-
ing map W ′Ak = ΠW˜
′
Ak
, where Π is the orthogonal pro-
jector onto HM . The strategies A˜′ and A′ are equivalent:
whenever a message sent according to A˜′ causes Bob to
abort the game, the strategy A′ requires Alice to abort
the game herself. Similarly, given any cheating strategy
B˜′ for Bob in the game P˜ , there is an equivalent cheating
strategy B′ in P . Thus, conditions 2 and 3 are satisfied,
and P˜ simulates P .
Our analysis of superselection rules in Sec. VIII E will
be based on a closely related method of simulation.
We also remark that Theorem 1 proved in Sec. III
can be restated: for a multiparty protocol P in the G-
invariant world, there is a U -world protocol P˜ that sim-
ulates P . In that case, we implicitly adopt a redundant
description of the physical states appearing in P , admit-
ting fictitious color degrees of freedom. Then P˜ is exactly
the same protocol as P , but with the color now reinter-
preted as a physical variable. Similarly, Theorem 3 in
Sec. VIIC can be stated: any n-party I-world protocol
in which the initial state is a product of n invariant states
can be simulated by an I-world protocol in which the ini-
tial state is a product of n pure states, each with trivial
charge.
E. Proof
Our goal is to prove:
Theorem 4 Let P be a two-party game in the I-world,
such that both parties hold trivial charges at the begin-
ning of the game. Then there is a U -world game P˜ that
simulates P .
In the proof we construct the U -world protocol P˜ that
simulates the I-world protocol P , and explain how the
cheating strategy A′ that is equivalent to A˜′ is formu-
lated. We achieve this by applying the procedure for
simulating charge exchange in the U -world that was de-
scribed in Sec. VIII C.
Consider the I-world protocol P . If the total charge
is trivial, then the full Hilbert space including Alice’s
system A, Bob’s system B, and the message M is
H =
⊕
qA,qB ,qM
HA,qA ⊗HB,qB ⊗HM,qM ⊗ V qA,qB ,qM1 .
(115)
Without loss of generality we assume that the spaces
HA,qA , HB,qB , HM,qM are the same in each step of
the protocol. We may also assume that the message is
present at the beginning and at the end of the game and
that the initial state has the form |ξA〉⊗|ξB〉⊗|0〉, where
|0〉 ∈ HM,1.
Each time Alice receives one message and sends an-
other, she applies an operator to AM that preserves
Bob’s charge qB; this is a contracting map belonging to
the algebra
⊕
qB
L
( ⊕
qA,qM
HA,qA ⊗HM,qM ⊗ V qA,qB ,qM1
)
. (116)
Alice’s honest strategy consists of a sequence of such op-
erators — in the kth step she applies an operator WAk .
Similarly, Bob’s honest strategy is defined by operators
WBk .
Now consider the U -world protocol P˜ that simulates
P . The Hilbert space of P˜ is
H˜ = H˜A ⊗ H˜B ⊗ H˜M , (117)
where
H˜A =
⊕
q1
HA,q1 , H˜B =
⊕
q2
HB,q2 ,
H˜M =
⊕
qA,qB ,qM
HM,qM ⊗ V qA,qB ,qM1 .
(118)
Thus the space H of the protocol P can be embedded in
H˜ by requiring q1 = qA and q2 = qB. In P˜ , these con-
straints are enforced by checks performed by both parties.
A dishonest player’s attempt to break the constraints will
be detected immediately by the other party, in which case
the game will halt.
Let us describe Alice’s honest strategy in P˜ . When
Alice receives a message, she gains control of the space
H˜A ⊗ H˜M . First she verifies that q1 = qA (without de-
termining the value of q1 or qA); if verification fails, she
aborts the game. Thus Alice effectively projects her in-
put state onto the subspace
HAM =
⊕
qA,qB ,qM
HA,qA⊗HM,qM⊗V qA,qB ,qM1 ⊆ H˜A⊗H˜M .
(119)
Then she applies the operator WAk (from the protocol
P ), which acts on HAM and preserves qB . Thus Alice’s
strategy is defined by the contracting maps
W˜Ak = FWAkF
†, (120)
where F denotes the embedding HAM → H˜A ⊗ H˜M .
Bob’s honest strategy is defined similarly.
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If both players play the game P˜ honestly, then the
verification always succeeds and the conditions q1 = qA
and q2 = qB are maintained throughout the game. Thus
the honest strategies for P˜ and P are clearly equivalent.
Note that in P˜ some information is encoded redundantly
— for example Alice can access the value of qA by exam-
ining either the charge label of HA,qA or one of the slots
of the tensor V qA,qB ,qM1 ; similarly qM is encoded both in
HM,qM and in V qA,qB ,qM1 . However, this redundancy has
no deleterious effect on the fidelity of the simulation.
Now suppose that Alice cheats in the game P˜ . Then
she may use an arbitrary Hilbert space H˜′A and operators
W˜ ′Ak acting on
H˜′AM = H˜′A ⊗ H˜M
= H˜′A ⊗
( ⊕
qA,qB ,qM
HM,qM ⊗ V qA,qB ,qM1
)
. (121)
In particular, when Alice cheats her action on the mes-
sage need not respect the condition qB = q2. To prove the
theorem, we are to define an equivalent cheating strategy
for the game P .
When Alice cheats in P , she uses an arbitrary Hilbert
space H′A,qA for each value of her charge qA, and she
applies operators W ′Ak that conserve Bob’s charge qB to
the space
H′AM =
⊕
qA,qB ,qM
H′A,qA ⊗HM,qM ⊗ V qA,qB ,qM1 . (122)
The spaces H˜′AM and H′AM seem to be distinct — in
H′AM the charge label carried byH′A,qA matches the label
in one of the slots of V qA,qB ,qM1 , while in H˜′AM there is no
such correlation. However, in the U -world the variable
qA would be encoded redundantly if it appeared in both
H′A,qA and V
qA,qB ,qM
1 , and it is not necessary to adopt
this redundant encoding in order to emulate the physics
of the I-world. Instead, let us specify H′A,qA = H˜′A for
each qA — thenH′AM and H˜′AM are of the same form, but
where it is understood in eq. (121) that the information
about the charge qA is carried only by V
qA,qB ,qM
1 . With
this choice Alice’s operator W˜ ′Ak in P˜ and her operator
W ′Ak in P act on isomorphic spaces; however W
′
Ak
must
conserve Bob’s charge qB, while W˜
′
Ak
need not conserve
charge.
Therefore, we define the corresponding cheating strat-
egy in P by specifying
W ′Ak =
∑
qB
ΠqBW˜
′
Ak
ΠqB , (123)
where ΠqB is the projector onto the subspace with the
given value of qB . That is, ΠqB projects H˜M onto the
space in which V qA,qB ,qM1 has the value qB in the ap-
propriate slot. The contracting map W ′Ak preserves qB
and therefore is admissible in the protocol P . Applying
this W ′Ak causes Alice to abort the game P in the case
where qB would change in the game P˜ . But in that case
the new value of qB would not match Bob’s variable q2;
therefore Bob would reject Alice’s message and abort the
game P˜ . Hence the two games P and P˜ are aborted
with the same probability; furthermore, the final state
that Bob measures in P˜ , if P˜ does not abort, is identical
to the final state that Bob measures in P , if P does not
abort. Therefore, when Alice cheats, Bob’s measurement
outcome has the same probability distribution in P˜ as in
P . The same is true for Alice’s measurement when Bob
cheats. Therefore, P˜ simulates P , which completes the
proof of Theorem 4.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Recent progress in the theory of quantum computation
and quantum cryptography highlights the importance of
adopting a computational model compatible with fun-
damental physics — tasks that would be impossible in
a classical world may be physically realizable because
Nature is quantum mechanical. Further refinements of
the model could lead to further insights regarding what
information-processing tasks are achievable. Therefore,
as Popescu [12] emphasized, the impact of superselection
rules on the security of quantum protocols is of consider-
able potential interest. However, our disappointing con-
clusion is that superselection rules cannot foil a cheater
who has unlimited quantum-computational power.
Contemplating this issue has led us to consider how
physics in the invariant world can simulate physics in
the unrestricted world, and vice versa. We feel that the
simulation schemes we have devised offer fruitful insights
into the physical meaning of superselection rules.
Our results do not address whether the security of pro-
tocols with more than two parties can be enhanced by
superselection rules that do not arise from compact sym-
metry groups. New issues arise in this setting, because of
the nontrivial braiding properties of nonabelian anyons.
For example, in the case of three parties (Alice, Bob, and
Charlie), Alice can split her charge into two parts, and
send one part on a voyage that circles Bob’s lab and then
returns to Alice’s lab. This action can induce a change in
the charge held by Alice, accompanied by a compensating
change in the total charge held by Bob and Charlie, even
though the local charge in Bob’s lab, and in Charlie’s, is
unaltered. Though strictly speaking Alice’s operation is
not “local,” she can carry it out surreptitiously, without
any cooperation from Bob and Charlie. Such new possi-
bilities enhance the potential power of cheaters, but may
also provide the honest parties with new methods for de-
tecting cheating. Addressing the security of multiparty
quantum protocols subject to general superselection rules
will require different methods than we have used in this
paper, and might provide further enlightenment concern-
ing the physics of nonabelian anyons.
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